SAFTU SALUTES ALL WHO VOTED IN THE 2024 ELECTION – EVEN IF PARTICIPATION WAS LOWER DUE TO A LACK OF ENTHUSIASM AND IEC FLAWS, IN TURN, DUE TO TREASURY AUSTERITY
The South African Federation of South Africa (SAFTU) salutes the South African public, in and outside the republic, for coming in numbers to cast their votes in the seventh democratic elections. These elections are important historically and politically. They represent the most profound triumph over apartheid: the right to vote won for the black majority. And incidents of voting-day violence were negligible.
SAFTU commends the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) and accepts the declaration of the election outcomes. They represent the true choices of South Africans. Despite glitches related to technological and logistical problems, the IEC system had backup arrangements and let those standing in queues vote even after 9 pm. As a result, the South African population made a fascinating pronouncement on the political parties of their choice.
We do acknowledge the relatively small number of discrepancies identified by political parties. In several incidences, voting slips photographed by party agents did not match the captured slips and final results. In other instances, the captured slips appear scratched and re-written. In cases where political parties raised these incidences of crookery and concretely produced evidence, the IEC was able to correct this. In some voting districts, the IEC carried out a recount. For these reasons, SAFTU recognises the efforts to resolve these discrepancies and accepts that the elections are legitimate. No re-voting needs to be conducted.
Voter Turnout, Incapacity and Fiscal Austerity
The voter turnout could have been better than the 2019 national general elections. In 2019, the turnout was 66%. In 2024, it was only 58%. Only 16.2 million out of 27,6 million registered voters cast their vote. Compared to the eligible voting population—citizens above age 18—which is 40,2 million, only 37,5% of the eligible voters cast their votes. The outcomes reflect a minority vote, and even in a coalition, the 2024-29 government that emerges from this election will be minority-supported.
It is noteworthy that of those 27.7 million registered voters, 12,384,101 (44.75%) are male, and 15,288,163 (55.25%) are female. This suggests a gender bias towards democratic participation, in which women have a greater commitment to our electoral system.
The loss of faith in the political parties is partly due to perceptions of fast-rising corruption in Cyril Ramaphosa’s government (measured by Transparency International in 2024 as 83rd least corrupt of 180 states, having fallen from 69th least corrupt in 2019, his first full year in office) and the arrogance of ANC leaders from national to local. Doubts about Ramaphosa’s business practices and Illicit Financial Flows, associated with dubious mining deals – with the likes of Glencore and Lonmin – and his Phala Phala cash-in-couch scandal certainly weigh upon the minds of our society.
We also blame the ruling party’s general neglect of communities and economic policies that, long after COVID-19 ended, imposed declining per-person incomes amidst the recent upsurge in food and energy (electricity and petrol) price inflation. However, the other contributing factor we intend to focus on is the IEC’s incapacity.
In bigger towns, technical problems at the IEC – especially reliance upon faulty machines – deterred many from voting due to the unusually long queues. In many places, especially working-class neighbourhoods, these queues were unbearably long and generated impatience, leading to people leaving before voting. In addition, the lack of adequate voter education during these elections has meant many people, especially the youth, queued in the wrong voting districts. Many did not know they were supposed to change their voting districts to match their current locations or districts of their choice. This created despair, and many young people returned to their homes without voting.
Fewer voting districts and voting stations created the incapacity. In areas like Johannesburg, eThekwini, Cape Town, and Tshwane CBDs, the voting districts need to be increased to ensure that the population is manageable with the physical location and human resource capacity. The IEC determines the voting districts by a minimum of “3,000 voters located within a radius of some 7,5 km of the voting station” in urban areas. However, as witnessed in the recent election, the registered population in some voting districts overwhelmed them. It shows that voting districts should be increased, but we also need more stations within each voting district.
Increasing the number of voting districts and stations will require increasing electoral voting and security personnel. However, the IEC has been hit with successive budget cuts from the National Treasury. My Vote Counts, an organisation in fraternal relations with SAFTU, has lamented these budget cuts and warned of their imminent consequences. In 2023, they reported that R800 million was projected to be cut from the IEC in the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF). Under these cuts, it is evident that the IEC would need more capacity to ensure smoother elections across all the rural and urban areas.
However, the National Treasury has released a statement disputing the accusations of underfunding the IEC. It argues that it allowed the IEC to retain its accumulated surpluses of R1.5 billion and utilise them for the elections. It further asserted that it allocated R2,3 billion to the IEC, for which it transferred R322.2 million in April 2024. In light of this, the mismanagement from within the IEC has also contributed to the inconveniences that turned away many from voting. They ought to have utilised the surplus to expand their staff and increase their voting districts in metro municipalities.
But fiscal austerity sabotaged electoral education. The transfers Treasury made to the IEC in April were late. They were bound to be late because the financial year starts in April. Budget cuts in previous years have adversely affected IEC electoral education, which is why young people did not know how to select the voting districts and ended up pitching at the wrong voting districts.
We must remind society that in mid-2020, the Treasury contracted a $4.3 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund and later took on more than $2.5 billion in loans from the World Bank. The Bretton Woods Institution conditionalities agreed to by then-finance minister Tito Mboweni and his successor Enoch Godongwana confirmed there would be substantial budget cuts in coming years, which is why the IEC is underfunded. Those institutions have traditionally held democracy in low regard, imposing their dictates from Washington DC and their imperialist partners in Western Europe.
Electoral Results
Parties 2024 2019 2014
ANC 40,18% (6.4 million) 57,5% (10 million) 62,13% (11,4 million)
DA 21,8% (3,5 million) 20,77% (3,6 million) 22,23% (4 million)
MK 14,58% (2,3 million) – –
EFF 9,57% (1,5 million 10,8% (1,8 million) 6,35% (1,1 million)
IFP 3,85% (618 207) 3,38% (588 839) 2,4% (441 854)
PA 2,06% (330 425) – –
VF+ 1,38% (218 850) 2,38% (414 864) 0,9% (165 715)
The ANC is the biggest loser, declining by over 3,6 million votes between 2019 and 2024. This consistent decline of the ANC has been precipitated by a deteriorating quality of their governance, measured through festering corruption and fiscal austerity measures that have sabotaged the delivery of services in our communities. The numbers of unemployed people (especially between ages 18-35), which has grown acute in recent years, reflect the government’s industrial policy failures, shrinking infrastructure investment and inadequate state service provision – all of which should be creating jobs.
The DA has regained support in percentage – winning 1% more than in 2019 – but has declined in real terms. It lost 100,000 votes in 2019 and 500,000 compared to 2014. Except for labour market policies, the DA’s economic policy is similar to the ANC’s. Its foreign policy is reactionary to Israel, and its white-dominated leadership serves as an indictment of apartheid and colonial residues, especially given the pro-colonialism tweets of the most recognised party leader, Helen Zille. Having hounded Mmusi Maimane and Herman Mashaba out of leadership, it was clear that the DA would not increase its vote, especially amongst black middle-class voters. It has retained some votes by eating into support for the Freedom Front +, which lost about 200,000 votes.
The constant decline in support for both the ANC and DA reflects, to some extent, workers’ realisation that these two main parties are on the same side of the class barricade.
The EFF’s voting base declined by 300 000 compared to 2019, which was a 1.2% smaller share of the total, down to 9.57% – a surprise given that in prior months, Julius Malema’s party had polled above 18% on occasion. Partially, the factor for this decline has been the umKhonto we Sizwe (MK) party, especially in KwaZulu-Natal. Both parties appeal to the same electoral base. The EFF’s manifesto was by far the most cogent programme of action. Still, MK’s edge over the EFF can only be explained by Jacob Zuma’s popularity arising from his status as a victim of corruption prosecution during Ramaphosa’s (similarly corrupt) government and hatred of Zuma by white monopoly capital. Perhaps the traditional voters of the ANC were seeking to punish the current leadership by voting for Zuma. Other commentators point to narrow Zulu nationalism as a factor that consolidated his support.
The Patriotic Alliance’s rise shows that if the economic marginalisation of black people (particularly the Africans and Coloureds) is not addressed, the conditions for reactionary ideas of Xenophobia and tribalism gain traction. Such ideas must be contested by a society that is intrinsically pan-Africanist and internationalist, thanks to the role our neighbouring countries played in the fight against colonialism and apartheid.
Coalitions and paths for a new government
The ANC’s loss of majority votes and the subsequent inability of other parties to win a majority vote mean that we are confronted with the eventuality of a national coalition government.
The bitterness of Zuma and many in the MK Party towards Ramaphosa will most likely make a coalition of the ANC and MK impossible. However, some divisions are already emerging within the ANC since many would prefer such a coalition, and they may revolt against the Ramaphosa faction if it instead chooses the DA as its primary partner in the coming days. But the chances of those dissidents winning are slim, if nonexistent. This leaves the ANC with the choice of opting for EFF, PA, and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) coalition or courting the DA and IFP.
Perhaps a coalition with the EFF could nudge the ANC towards progressive reforms, such as increasing state ownership – of the Reserve Bank, a national state bank and a pharmaceutical firm – and halting the unbundling of Eskom. We hope the EFF, were it in a ruling coalition, would push to abolish the disastrous tender system. But an EFF and ANC coalition alone cannot happen, as their votes combined do not make 50%. They will need a third party.
In contrast, an ANC-DA-IFP coalition will bring economic doomsday for workers. Even if the ANC may successfully prevent the repeal of pro-worker legislation, it will be a coalition based on a neoliberal macroeconomic framework. The ANC is already implementing such a framework. Hence, DA leader John Steinhuisen said that after the budget speeches in 2023 and 2024, Godogwana copied the fiscal measures from the DA’s economic playbook. So, such a combination will be even more neoliberal than at present, at the expense of workers and the poor.
The absence of a mass-based workers’ party is a problem that we and other working-class formations are responsible for. That void means that workers have to settle for coalitions of pro-capitalist parties. The least we can hope for is a coalition that will produce the following:
a) Greater public ownership and the reversal of the unbundling of Eskom and State Companies,
b) Fiscal expansion and a more sensible monetary policy (backed by tighter exchange controls) so that public service institutions can get more resources to increase public service headcount, infrastructure and equipment, and interest rates can be lowered dramatically (as occurred in 2020-21),
c) Strong anti-corruption stance and clean government from municipalities to public service institutions, from SOEs to Higher education institutions. Destroy the construction mafias and criminal syndicates, which include much of corporate South Africa (usually rated among the top two “economic crime and fraud” capitalist classes in the world by PwC),
d) Industrialise the economy and create jobs in the process, primarily through vitally-needed solar, wind, energy-storage and climate-adaptation infrastructure (as witnessed by lack of preparedness for the highly destructive storms that hit parts of South Africa shortly after the election).
e) Protect the Constitution’s Bill of Rights, particularly labour, women, and socioeconomic rights. Take steps to give these rights full meaning in the Constitution and concretely in real life. Resist any move towards patriarchal, tribalist, ethnicist, narrow-nationalist, racist-chauvinist, homophobic and xenophobic attitudes. Strive for equality between men and women, including protecting the rights of those with a different sexual orientation. Reject any move towards creating a rules system that favours leadership. In short, we insist on moving towards building an egalitarian society.
The State and Workers
The state is the instrument of class rule. Without a worker’s party that can rule democratically on behalf of working-class people, the state is contested by different political parties representing the interests of the capitalist (business) class. These parties rule on behalf of the capitalist class. Capitalist policies include structural reforms, fiscal austerity, monetary austerity, liberalised finance, deindustrialisation and privatisation. These policies are reflected in varying degrees across the manifestos of the political parties. In other words, these parties differ in logos but are one in their class policies and agenda.
In our launching congress, SAFTU delegates resolved that “The only way out of the crisis has to be through a mass movement of the working class based on a program guided by the principles of Marxism-Leninism for the nationalisation of the mineral and manufacturing monopolies, the banks and the land, in line with the aspiration expressed in the Freedom Charter.” The special central committee in November 2018 ratified the NEC decision of that year saying “the only way forward is through building a Workers Party, in line with the founding Congress’s resolution, and that only the working class can sustain the struggle and overthrow the ruling class and its barbaric capitalist system.”
The working class summit 2018 affirmed this resolution by unanimously agreeing “on a need to build an independent, democratic and revolutionary working-class political party, which will be strong enough to conquer social, economic and political power, abolish the capitalist system and replace it with socialism.”
The assessment and resolutions of SAFTU throughout its existence have always been that workers must build their party to contest state power. This will save us from having to choose between better devils. Attempts to form a workers’ party have been made, but each time, they have failed. This exposes the weaknesses in the methods that have been utilised. We must—and we certainly can—do better in the coming weeks, months, and years.
